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Tow ards a cr it ique of ant i- Germ an ‘com m unism ’1  
Raphael Schlem bach 
 
 
Abstract  
The spectre of anti-Ger mans has easily become the Feindbild for  activists of the 
Anglophone Left;  yet rarely does this translate into fundamental or  informed 
cr iticism of the anti-German premise. This ar ticle, then, offers an introductor y 
descr iption and a cr itical analysis of pro-Israeli , anti-German communism in i ts 
context within the post-war  Ger man Left and as a contemporar y protest 
movement that sits oddly on the fr inges of r adical politics. I ts or igins and politics 
are examined to depict the radicalisation of a broad anti-nationalist campaign 
against Ger man re-unification, and its evolution into a small but coherent anti-
German movement, controversial for  i ts pro-Israel polemics and provocations. 
Cur rent debates within the anti-fascist German Left are reviewed to explore anti-
German positions on the Holocaust, Israel, Islam, anti-imper ialism and 
Germany’s foreign policy. Theoretical works that have heavily influenced anti-
German communism are discussed to comprehend the movement’s intellectual 
inspirations. The purpose of the ar ticle is to introduce one of Germany’s most 
controversial protest movements to an English-speaking audience and to hint at 
the formulation of a cr itique that is more than a knee-jer k reaction to pro-Israeli  
agitation. 
 
 
 
I nt roduct ion 
Anti-German communism is a political tendency that grew from within the German 
radical Left, and that has adopted a pro-Western/ pro-Israel discourse and critiques 
of post-Nazi Germany and Islamic antisemitism as its defining ideological 
characteristics. Despite being intellectually inspired by the writings of Karl Marx 
and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, the subsequent reinterpretation and 
political contortion of these texts by the ‘anti-Germans’ has fuelled an antagonistic 
relationship with large parts of the German (and global) Left. The common left-
                                                  
1
 A much earlier version of this paper was presented to the Popular  Protest and Alternative Futur es 
11 conference at Manchester Metropolitan University, April 2006. All translations from literature in 
German are mine, unless noted otherwise. 
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wing premises of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism are regarded by the anti-
Germans as expressions of a continuation of the ‘logic of Auschwitz’ that reflects 
totali tarian, fascistic thought in the national mindsets of most Germans, Europeans 
and beyond. 
Talking about the anti-Germans is a bit anachronistic, of course. Anti-German 
communism as a movement, in the sense of informing the practical and strategic 
politics of German anti-fascism, is connected to the decade or so immediately after 
German re-unification. In i ts more narrow sense, as a theoretically distinct but 
practically irrelevant contrarian position, anti-German communism has also seen 
its heyday. Anti-German ideas sti ll persist nonetheless, in a number of periodicals 
and communist organisations, and continue to have some influence on the German 
anti-fascist movement and some unorthodox Marxist circles. I t is also rather 
unhelpful to speak of ‘the anti-Germans’ as if they represented a homogenous 
movement. This is even more so as the ideas and positions of anti-German authors, 
activists and groups have tended to undergo rapid development in an effort to gain 
‘avant-garde’ status in the radical Left. A first categorisation is often used in 
German-language debates to distinguish between various ‘hardcore’ and ‘softcore’ 
trends. Hardcore anti-Germans, around the journal Bahamas and the Freiburg 
Initiative Sozialistisches Forum, have now mostly taken leave from left-wing 
political movements; yet it is they who often remain the object of controversy. 
Bahamas and their supporters in particular have made a point of declaring both 
left-wing and Islamist anti-imperialism as their enemy, often descending into 
vitriolic attacks against Muslims and Arabs in Europe – to such an extent that the 
tendency might now be best described as an ‘anti-Islam materialism’. The various 
softcore anti-German projects continue to exert some theoretical influence 
especially on anti-fascist poli tics. The journal Phase 2 for example has emerged 
from the German ‘Antifa’ movement and now combines anti-German thought with 
elements from critical theory and post-structuralism to form a political perspective 
that is sometimes described as ‘post-Antifa’. Now defunct is the journal 17 Grad, 
which was based on Foucaultian theory and discourse analysis. The longstanding 
magazine Konkret has evolved from a more orthodox Marxist analysis but has also 
supported and developed anti-German positions in the past. The widely-read 
weekly newspaper Jungle Wor ld regularly publishes anti-German authors, but 
actually prints articles from a variety of radical poli tical perspectives. 
However, it has been years since anti-German publications regularly sparked 
controversy and sometimes violent conflict amongst the German Left. Now, many 
writers, publishers and activists who had spearheaded the anti-German movement 
have retreated from left-wing circles and discussion. Nonetheless, in the English-
speaking Left in particular, the anti-Germans are sti ll subject to polemical 
controversy and outrage, often resulting from a fascination with the waving of 
American, British and Israeli  national flags by German anti-fascists. There are very 
few substantial English-language texts available however (Grigat 2005; Radke 
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2004 are amongst the more i lluminating introductions), although whenever the 
topic is raised on left-wing online forums, blogs or in face-to-face conversation it is 
sure to generate long discussions. To date, there is only one academic publication 
about the anti-Germans in English language. The article in the Jewish Political 
Studies Review (Erlanger 2009) is largely descriptive and focuses on the pro-Israel 
stance of the movement. Keeping in mind the somewhat sketchy information so far 
available to the English-language reader, what I  offer here is primarily a historical 
overview of the origins and political formation of the anti-Germans and, secondly, a 
pointer towards a more fundamental critique of their poli tics. 
Events in the recent history of the extra-parliamentary Left in Germany are crucial 
to understanding why anti-German currents play a prominent role in it. I  trace the 
development of anti-German communist thought in four steps. First, I  look at some 
of the influences that can be found in the work of pre-unification writers, such as 
Jean Améry or Eike Geisel. Second, the movement against German political re-
unification will be discussed as the immediate ‘trigger’ or springboard for the 
emergence of anti-German communism as protest movement. Third, the anti-
German response to events such as the Kosovo war and 9/ 11 i llustrate how parts of 
the movement have severed their ties with the poli tics of the Left. In a final section, 
I  indicate how the anti-German ideology remains firmly stuck in nationalist and 
identity politics.  
 
 
Post - Holocaust  origins 
The anti-German self-understanding is one that combines criticism of German 
nationalism and political Islam with a more general critique of nation and state. I t 
explicitly sees itself in contrast to the anti-imperialist and autonomous Left of the 
1970s and 80s with its strong support for national liberation movements and vocal 
opposition to American and Israeli mili tarism. Put very simply, for the anti-
Germans, anti-fascism in a world divided into states is synonymous with solidarity 
with Israel. The Israeli state is seen as the necessary reaction to the fascist 
barbarism of the Third Reich and that continues to rear its head in the 
Bundesrepublik. This inversion of the anti-imperialist premise is certainly at odds 
with left-wing poli tics in Anglo-Saxon countries and elsewhere outside this context. 
However, calls for solidarity with Israel and distrust of anti-Zionism are more 
commonplace in the German radical Left. Some of the most fervent critics of the 
anti-Germans would go to length to defend Zionism as the basis of the Israeli state 
(for example Robert Kurz 2003). Also many anti-fascist groups that do not belong 
to the anti-German spectrum practice and demonstrate solidarity with Israel and 
focus strongly on the continuing antisemitism in neo-Nazi movements. 
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The specificity of i ts National Socialist history has always been a central point of 
reference for the (West-)German Left. Concerned with ‘explaining the 
unexplainable’, the Left subscribed to a poli tics of remembrance. The ‘lessons’ 
drawn from the terror of National Socialism and the Holocaust thereby remain 
fundamental to a radical theory and practice. Concepts and ideologies that had 
been paramount to the Third Reich, such as ‘the German people’, ‘nation’ or 
antisemitism are thus important points of reference. Radical left-wing criticism of 
anti-Zionism in Germany also emerged long before one could speak of an anti-
German movement. Even texts from an armed anti-mili tarist group (Revolutionäre 
Zellen 1991) and an autonomist group (Autonome LUPUS-Gruppe 2001) criticised 
some aspects of anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. The question of antisemitism 
had thus taken a prominent place in the internal discussion of the German 
Autonome movement already in the 1970s and 1980s. Critical voices were often the 
result of the fai lures of national liberation movements. A striking example was a 
failed attempt to liberate a number of Palestinian prisoners and members of the 
Red Army Faction, including Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. In 1976, a 
commando group of Palestinians and members of the Revolutionäre Zellen had 
hijacked a plane leaving Israel, demanding the release of poli tical prisoners. The 
hijackers eventually let non-Jewish and non-Israeli  hostages disembark from the 
grounded aircraft, while Israeli Jews were kept hostage unti l their liberation by 
anti-terror units. Nevertheless, accusations that anti-imperialist politics had 
slipped into overt antisemitism were voiced by only a few in the radical Left (see 
Hanloser 2004b).  
The Austrian author Jean Améry was one of the earliest voices to warn of a 
dangerous turn away from remembering Germany’s antisemitic past and present. A 
participant in the Resistance and concentration camp survivor, Améry has become 
known for his autobiographical essays about Auschwitz and his life after the 
Holocaust. I t is easy to see how his writings have had a major influence on the anti-
German spectrum. Both his life and his texts speak of an absolute irreconcilabili ty 
with Germany and a deep-rooted fear of an antisemitic resurgence. Born as Hans 
Maier in Vienna, in 1938 he emigrated from Austria to Belgium. On the arrival of 
the German troops he was imprisoned in France but escaped. Back in Belgium, he 
joined the Resistance but in 1943 was arrested again and deported to Auschwitz, 
then moved to Buchenwald and later to Bergen-Belsen. He left Germany after the 
war and despite continuing to write in German, now under the name Jean Améry, 
he initially refused to publish his texts in the Federal Republic. Instead, he worked 
and published as a journalist for numerous newspapers in Switzerland. His name 
change to Améry, an anagram of his given name, has become symbolic of his 
acceptance of a new secular Francophone identity and his reluctance to forgive the 
atrocities committed by the Germans. Améry committed suicide in 1978 in 
Salzburg.  
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In 1966 Améry published his only book on Auschwitz and the Holocaust, which was 
to become his most important work. I t was translated and published in English as 
At the Mind’s Limits in 1980 (Améry 1980). Here he reflects about the state of 
mind of the victim in Auschwitz, torture, exi le, his resentments against the 
Germans and his reluctant identification as a Jew. At the Mind’s Limits was in 
many ways Améry’s entrance into German li terary circles and made him a widely 
read author over night. However, he remained sceptical about his sudden fame: 
I  have the suspicion that I  merely struck a chord that began to vibrate just at a 
time when it was sti ll fashionable to occupy oneself with the fate of the Nazi 
victims, and that [by the late seventies], when my friends on the Left are 
representing Israel as a universal plague and everyone’s sympathies are 
focused on the Palestinian resistance fighters, I  couldn’t tempt a soul with this 
book (quoted in Myers 2002). 
The concern with a revitalisation of antisemitism amongst his “friends on the Left” 
is also the subject of Améry’s influential essay Der  ehrbare Antisemitismus (The 
reputable antisemitism), which first appeared in the German weekly Die Zeit in 
1969 (Améry 1969). Here he attacks a left-wing antisemitism that was no longer 
confined to socialist and communist parties, but had begun to materialise in the 
extra-parliamentary Left. The Six-Day War of 1967, Améry writes, had resurrected 
the image of the Jew as oppressor and war-monger, as capitalist and profiteer. He 
famously concludes: “ I t’s a fact: Anti-Semitism, contained in anti-Israelism and 
anti-Zionism like the tempest in a cloud, is reputable again” (Améry 1969). 
Jean Améry was not alone with his criticism of left-wing antisemitism. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, there were others – Eike Geisel and Wolfgang Pohrt, for example – who 
identified a stealthy acceptance of antisemitic undertones in Germany’s moderate 
and radical Left. Singled out for criticism was, more often than not, the broad peace 
movement – nicknamed the ‘peace mob’ – that stood united in i ts opposition to the 
militarism of the United States. For author and journalist Wolfgang Pohrt (1982, 
1984), the peace movement concealed differences of class and politics and in their 
place created the possibility of a German national self-discovery rooted in anti-
Americanism. Pohrt predicted the end of left-wing politics in Germany: “A peace 
movement that knows no political parties or social classes, but only Ger mans, can 
only achieve one aim: the final fai lure of the Left”  (Pohrt 1982, 73). Furthermore, 
Pohrt attacked anti-Zionism and the widespread support for the Palestinian 
liberation movement as a new manifestation of persisting antisemitic sentiments in 
Germany. The hatred of the US and Israel could unite the Left in a common 
movement that did not have to carry the burden of the past. Simi lar claims were 
made by the essayist Eike Geisel who criticised the peace movement for i ts anti-
Israeli  position and its attempt to leave Germany’s National Socialist past behind 
(Geisel 1984, 1992, 1998). His polemical style caused controversy amongst his 
German and Israeli readership and made him a notorious critic of left-wing anti-
Zionism.   
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Moishe Postone’s critique of the Left was also an early influence for the emerging 
anti-German movement. In some of his texts, he found himself particularly 
shocked by the ease with which the German Left had ceased to confront the past 
and every-day realities of antisemitism in Germany (Postone 1986, 2005). The 
American social scientist had studied in Frankfurt during the 1970s and had kept 
strong ideological links with parts of the German radical Left after his return to the 
US. Although he had always remained critical during his years in Frankfurt, his 
break with the German Left became clear in his 1985 open letter, which addressed 
the ‘Bitburg affair’. In May 1985, German chancellor Helmut Kohl had invited US 
president Reagan to the Federal Republic of Germany. The visit sparked off 
protests and peace marches everywhere in the country, directed against US 
imperialism and war. Hundreds of thousands turned up for demonstrations and 
rallies. However, when Kohl and Reagan visited a mili tary cemetery in Bitburg, 
which was also the burial ground for a number of SS-soldiers, only a few hundred 
German anti-fascists staged a protest. The Bitburg affair was reported and 
discussed widely in the US press. However, German commentators remained 
relatively si lent. According to Postone, there was no shock or outrage about a 
German leader paying tribute to the victims of World War I I  on a cemetery of the 
perpetrator 40 years after the liberation from National Socialism. In his Open letter  
to the West-German Left, Postone called the day of Kohl’s visit to the cemetery a 
“day of disgrace” (Postone 2005, 51), unnoticed by the German population, which 
was content with the attempted reconciliation with Germany’s past. The Left in 
West Germany, in particular, had neglected its critical and emancipatory role and 
closed its eyes to that historic moment. Instead its fight against imperialism and 
war had become a pretext to avoid confrontation with the Holocaust (Postone 
2005, 56).  
Mainstream society too was sti ll dealing with its National Socialist past. In 
1986/ 87, a group of historians advanced new interpretations in the context of 
giving Germany a new national identity. Ernst Nolte, in a widely debated article, 
argued that the Soviet gulags, rather than Auschwitz, should be seen as the 
‘original’ horror, and that German Nazism was a reaction to Bolshevism. Jürgen 
Habermas accused Nolte and others of trying to portray National Socialism as a 
defence against Bolshevism, and of denying the singularity of German fascism. 
Habermas and Nolte were the main protagonists of a debate, known now as the 
Histor ikerstr eit (historians’ dispute, see New German Critique 1998), that tested 
the water for the possibili ty of a positive interpretation of German history. On the 
one side, conservative commentators argued for the centrality of Germany in the 
European community of nations-states based upon a guilt-free relationship with i ts 
history. On the other side, Habermas and others feared a conservative shift in 
German society and the alienation from the West. For Habermas, the only German 
nationalism that would not remove Germany from the achievements of the West or 
forget the terror of the past was a patriotism aligned to the constitutional values of 
the Federal Republic and to European integration.  
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I t is important to remember this pre-unification context in West Germany from 
which the anti-German critique emerged. I t was this atmosphere of ‘German 
informality’ and rediscovery which anti-Germans pledged to disrupt. They insisted 
on the commemoration of the Holocaust and the confrontation with Germany’s 
National Socialist past as backbones of any left-wing project. In the process, they 
have engaged with criticisms of capitalism from Marx to Adorno and Foucault to 
Postone. They have antagonised the peace movement and declared anti-
imperialists as their enemies. And, for a short while in the 1990s, they seemed to 
consolidate an anti-German campaign into a visible social movement that had a 
strong influence on left-wing debates in post-unification Germany.   
 
 
“Germ any –  never again” 
Major historical trigger events in the formation of the anti-Germans as a poli tical 
movement were the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989, German re-
unification on 3 October 1990 and the end of ‘real-existing socialism’. In the run up 
to German re-unification and the first general elections of the newly founded state, 
a broad anti-national campaign emerged that opposed the newly-gained influence 
of unified Germany as an economic power (Mohr and Haunss 2004). Plans of re-
unification were seen as a neo-imperialist West German coup to gain territory and 
international influence in the midst of a power vacuum in the East. The 
identification of a re-unified Germany with the German state of 1871-1933 was 
dismissed as a blatant move towards the establishment of a Fourth Reich. This 
Fourth Reich would not be built upon mili tary might, but instead would manifest 
itself as a German economic giant spearheading the European project of 
integration. The anti-national Left suggested that the conservative and right-wing 
political spectrum in a re-unified Germany could attempt to renegotiate Germany’s 
contentious Eastern border with Poland. I t was now witness to a historical 
situation where, 45 years after the fall of the Third Reich and Germany’s 
occupation by the allied forces, the country stood on the verge of regaining a 
hegemonic economic position in Europe. According to the campaign, there was no 
longer any feeling of guilt or even a sense that Germany had been punished for i ts 
World War I I  crimes. The German ‘nation’ had regained a positive image again and 
the notion of national pride was set to replace the one of collective guilt. Some in 
the anti-national coalition against re-unification even feared that the sudden rise of 
right-wing extremism could lead to a repetition of the events of 1933. 
Although it was not anti-German in the sense that we understand the term today, 
one could describe the campaign against re-unification as the first public 
manifestation of an emerging anti-German movement. The campaign was driven 
by the short-lived alliance Radikale Linke, which was formed mainly of 
communists from the Kommunistischer  Bund, members of the Greens and people 
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working for the periodical Konkret. In May 1990, more than 100 groups and 
organisations mobilised for an anti-national anti-unification rally to Frankfurt with 
the slogan ‘Germany – never again’. According to the organisers, the 
demonstration was 20,000 strong. Another march was held in Berlin with 10,000 
participants and a conference in Cologne attracted 1,500 (Hagen 2004; Schmid 
2004). 
Yet, this mobilisation was sti ll far from constituting a distinguishable anti-German 
critique of German re-unification. The groups that had called for the demonstration 
were too diverse in their poli tical ambitions and goals to form a homogenous 
movement. The rift was particularly clear between the long-established communist 
organisations and newer autonomous groups. Demonstrations and rallies that 
followed could never achieve a participation close to the 20,000 of the ‘Germany – 
never again’ rally again. After re-unification, the campaign collapsed. The Radikale 
Linke alliance dissolved and many of its members chose to join the post-
communist Democratic Socialist Party (PDS) or the Green Party. Nonetheless, a 
start had been made for the consolidation of the anti-German movement. In the 
years after re-unification, anti-Germans began to bestow themselves an identity as 
a social movement, forming groups, publishing theoretical and political material 
and building up resources such as magazines and journals. And they began to 
clarify and develop an anti-German criticism that was distinct and often 
diametrically opposed to the agenda of the German radical Left.  
In the early years of the anti-German movement, many of the controversies were 
driven by articles printed in anti-German magazines and by their publishers. 
Criticisms were often directed against the peace movement and aimed at attacking 
an apparently inherent nationalism and antisemitism on the Left. Increasingly, the 
anti-German position placed importance upon its support for the state of Israel. 
This came especially apparent in the wake of the second Gulf War in 1990/ 1991. 
After the US-led operation against I raq had begun, Saddam Hussein had 
threatened Israel with a gas attack. I t  emerged that much of the I raqi poison gas 
had been produced in West Germany. Israel did not form part of the war effort. 
Nonetheless, Iraqi rockets were fired onto Israeli  terri tory, although none of them 
was equipped with poison gas. The peace movement mobilised hundreds of 
thousands for i ts demonstrations against the war, which was financially supported 
by the German Christian Democratic government. In many of the protests, the US 
was singled out as the perpetrators of an unjust aggression. However, anti-Israel 
and anti-Zionist positions also found a platform.  
At this time, i t was the magazine Konkret in particular that lent a voice to anti-
German criticisms of the German pacifists. Eike Geisel, Hermann Gremliza and 
Wolfgang Pohrt were the most outspoken. They demanded that the German radical 
Left acted in solidarity with Israel that had been attacked by I raq. They were 
especially shocked at the possibi li ty of an I raqi rocket attack on Israel with 
German-made poison gas. Pohrt, for example, wrote: 
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I t is unbelievable that Auschwitz-survivors in Israel are forced to find 
protection in shelters at night, under the sound of alarm sirens and with gas 
masks, while here the children and grand-children of mass-murderers […] 
demand not the defence of the threatened, but peace with the aggressors 
(quoted in Hagen 2004, 25). 
Solidarity with Israel meant support for the war against Iraq. This position not only 
antagonised the traditional Left, but also many of the anti-national allies. Possible 
reasons for and against the war were fiercely debated in radical journals and 
newspapers. The pro-war anti-Germans were keen on pointing out the pacifism in 
the peace movement and its inherent contradiction in the context of the liberation 
of Germany from National Socialism with major mili tary means. They also argued 
that, despite Chancellor Kohl’s financial support for the war, the peace movement 
should be seen as a German national project and opposed as such. 
Those who described their own political positions as anti-German had often come 
from within the anti-national and anti-fascist movements in Germany. Radical 
anti-fascism had gained momentum with the rise of neo-Nazism and a number of 
racist and increasingly violent attacks on foreigners in the early 1990s. Re-
unification had triggered a series of racist attacks in both West and East Germany. 
Most notoriously, the suburb of Rostock-Lichtenhagen was the scene of a 
prolonged xenophobic attack on a hostel for Vietnamese asylum seekers in August 
1992. In the years after unification, over 135 foreigners were ki lled in similar racist 
attacks (Mut gegen rechte Gewalt 1999). In the wake of resentment and violence 
against asylum seekers the German Social Democrat government changed the laws 
regulating asylum claims, seemingly as a gesture towards the far right agenda. For 
many in the Left, such attacks and government ‘responses’ showed the racist 
consensus that permeated not only the fringes but society as a whole. 
Part of the anti-fascist movement began to question such a perspective, however, at 
a time when state actors became increasingly aware and intolerant of neo-Nazi 
activities. In 2000, after a high-profile arson attack on a synagogue, Germany’s 
Red-Green coalition government launched a zero-tolerance strategy of repression 
and surveillance against racist extremists in what was dubbed the ‘State-Antifa-
Summer’ (see TOP Berlin 2009). Organised neo-Nazi structures and scenes were 
targeted, for example through the ban of the music network ‘Blood and Honour’ or 
the attempted ban of the far right National Democratic Party (NPD). The 
Bundesver fassungsschutz (Federal Protection of the Constitution) also embarked 
on a large scale programme of surveillance and infi ltration of extreme right 
organisations. On the one hand, for revolutionary anti-fascist groups, it became 
increasingly difficult to paint the state as part of the racist consensus. On the other 
hand, the state also made use of existing and newly-founded civi l society actors to 
implement programmes for the reintegration of racists and Nazis into the 
mainstream of society. While the resurgence of racist attacks post-1989 eventually 
brought together police and civi l society activism, anti-German criticism was 
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developed as a theoretical current against the informal interest arrangement of 
state and anti-fascists. Practically, the anti-Germans at first continued to operate 
within the anti-fascist spectrum, especially in university-based groups, and to 
mobilise from within these ranks. However, revolutionary anti-fascism was 
eventually abandoned in favour of a critique of the ‘national body’ [Volkskörper ]  or 
the German nation as an ideological unit. 
  
Return to the  nat ion? 
One of the most controversial antisemitism debates in re-unified Germany (and 
indeed in other countries) was sparked off by the publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s 
book Hitler ’s Willing Executioner s (Goldhagen 1996). The book was a bestseller 
and reached far beyond a purely academic audience (Elsässer and Markovits 1999; 
Künzel et al. 1997; Schoeps 1996; for criticism of the Goldhagen thesis see for 
example Eley 2000). In i t, Goldhagen maintains the thesis that the Holocaust was 
the essential and inevitable outcome of National Socialist ideology. He argues that 
the Holocaust was particular to German National Socialism and could have 
happened in Germany only. For Goldhagen, it was the particular condition of 
German antisemitism – expressed by a large majority of the German population – 
that led to Auschwitz and the systematic murder of six million Jews. His study 
focuses on the perpetrators of the Holocaust and the involvement of “ordinary 
Germans” (Goldhagen 1996, 4). He challenges the proposition that the wider 
German population had no involvement and, indeed, no knowledge of the atrocities 
that were committed. The population, he elaborates, was neither forced to obey the 
orders to ki ll, nor was it subjected to punishment i f orders were objected to. 
Instead, Goldhagen grants a certain “moral autonomy” to the ordinary German 
citizen (ibid.). The Holocaust should therefore not be understood as a secret 
extermination program, but is rather “best conceived as a German national project”  
(ibid., 11). As Goldhagen puts i t, “[ t]he most appropriate, indeed the only 
appropriate general proper name for the Germans who perpetrated the Holocaust 
is ‘Germans’”  (ibid., 6; emphasis in the original). This emphasis on the Germans as 
perpetrators put German nationality and national essentialism back into the 
debates surrounding the Holocaust: “namely no Germans, no Holocaust”  (ibid.). 
The theoretical debates of the Goldhagen study are symptomatic of a wider trend in 
the anti-German movement at that time towards more radicalism, more 
provocation and more national essentialism (Brym 2006; Hanloser 2004a; Kurz 
2003). While this is certainly not true for the whole of the movement, so-called 
‘hardliners’ or ‘hardcore’ anti-Germans have come to dominate the scene with their 
politics and controversies. This became obvious from the debates that resulted 
from the 1999 Kosovo War. The Federal Republic was now under a new ‘Red-
Green’ leadership, a coalition of Social Democrats and Green Party. Green Party 
foreign minister Joschka Fischer ordered the first deployment of German troops 
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since 1945 in the war against Milosevic’s Serbia. The deployment was justified with 
reference to the historic duty to prevent another Auschwitz. Serbia, i t was argued, 
had committed genocide and ethnic cleansing. The radical Left was united in i ts 
opposition to the war. However, differences between anti-Germans and their anti-
national allies quickly became visible. The anti-Germans argued that the German 
war effort in Kosovo was essentially a war against Serbian nationalism. Therefore, 
they considered anti-nationalism to be synonymous with German foreign policy. I t 
was argued that anti-nationalism now justified a German war against a sovereign 
country and that the anti-nationalists had moved from a stance of “war – never 
again” to one of “war – never again without us” (Elsässer 1999). While the anti-
national opponents of the war criticised German and Serbian nationalism, the anti-
Germans argued that the two nationalisms were not equal to one another. The Left 
should refrain from criticising Milosevic’s actions at this moment and show their 
full solidarity and support for Serbia. The Kosovo War was seen as a German war, 
partly resulting from German foreign policy in Yugoslavia. The USA, from the anti-
German perspective, was only following Germany’s lead in attacking Serbia. As a 
consequence of the anti-German argumentation against the Kosovo War, anti-
nationalists became increasingly alienated from the anti-German cause. Gradually, 
the ‘hardliners’ found themselves without allies on the Left, but antagonistic to the 
peace movement, the counter-globalisation movement and the anti-nationalists. 
The rift between the anti-Germans on the one hand and the rest of the Left on the 
other widened dramatically from 2000 onwards, when anti-German positions on 
the second Inti fada, 9/ 11 and the Iraq War became untenable for the radical Left 
and internal confrontations multiplied. The events put a pro-Israeli  standpoint at 
the forefront of all anti-German criticism. With an increase of suicide and rocket 
attacks on Israel during the second Inti fada, anti-Germans demanded solidarity 
with the state of Israel from the German Left. Yet, from their perspective, the 
demands went unheard. Accordingly, they perceived a united front, or an 
‘Antisemitic International’, behind the Left’s condemnation of Israeli settlement 
policy and support for self-determination of the Palestinian people. For anti-
Germans, this denotes a return to the rhetoric and ideology of pre-1945 
nationalism. German antisemitism has turned into a blend of anti-Zionism and 
anti-Americanism, they argue. Furthermore, they identify an exacerbation of 
Islamic antisemitism, they believe to constitute the biggest threat to the state of 
Israel at this moment in time. Some anti-German groups have gone so far as to 
condemn Muslim immigrants in Germany for the return of an alleged antisemitic 
consensus in German society. Since the end of the 1990s, the pro-Israel tendencies 
amongst the anti-German communists have become visible on the streets, too. 
Anti-Germans have become most controversial for their display of national flags 
during anti-fascist demonstrations and Holocaust commemorations. The Israeli  
state flag is frequently used in actions and demonstrations against the processions 
and rallies of neo-Nazis in Germany. The existence of the state of Israel reminds 
right-wing extremists of Hitler’s fai lure to exterminate the Jews, they argue. 
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Moreover, anti-Germans display the national flags of the allied forces in World War 
I I  – France, Britain, the US and the Soviet Union – during numerous Holocaust 
commemoration services. A special event in the anti-German diary has become the 
anniversary of the British-led air strikes on Dresden in February 1945. Anti-
Germans then celebrate Germany’s liberation by the allied forces from National 
Socialism, while for neo-Nazis it has become a day of mourning. However, the 
display of those national flags is provocation not only to neo-Nazis but also to anti-
nationalists in the anti-fascist movement, and certainly to the anti-imperialists and 
pacifists on the Left. 
The attacks of 9/ 11 have only hardened the anti-German position. Since then, ideas 
expressed in the periodical Bahamas, in particular, have begun to move away from 
a criticism of German nationalism towards the notion of Islamo-fascism or ‘Islamic 
National Socialism’. From this perspective also “any criticism of the state of Israel 
is antisemitic” (Bruhn 2003). The pro-Israel, pro-US and anti-Islam stance of 
many anti-Germans cannot be understood without an appreciation of the 
relationship between anti-German critique and the Enlightenment process. 
Solidarity with Israel here does not represent identification with a nation-state, but 
constitutes an act that derives from an Enlightenment reasoning, which has as its 
ultimate aim a classless and stateless communist society. Defending Western 
values from ‘Islamic terror’, such anti-German perspectives regard the 
Enlightenment as an unfinished project, with capitalism representing a temporary 
step between theocracy and communism. Hence the celebrated anti-German 
phrase: “Israel is the armed attempt by the Jews to reach communism alive” 
(Initiative Sozialistisches Forum 2002). A communist revolution, however, is not 
possible unti l theocracy has been abolished. Here the US plays a leading role with 
its war on terror and Islamic fundamentalism. The fact that US policies are 
interest-driven does not change their usefulness in the Enlightenment process. In 
many ways, America has taken on this role from the French Republic. Originally, 
France and the French revolution were seen as bourgeois-revolutionary attempts to 
further the cause of the Enlightenment, and as such were supported by anti-
Germans. Now, the state of Israel is considered from a similar point of view. 
Zionism, according to some anti-Germans, is the only remaining bourgeois-
revolutionary project of the Enlightenment. More than that, i t is a Jewish 
emancipatory project. For some anti-Germans, contemporary Zionism is 
comparable to French Jacobinism. Therefore, any criticism of Israel is not only 
considered antisemitic but also reactionary. Rather than Israel being an imperialist 
outpost on Arab land, they regard it as an emancipatory refuge for Jewish 
Holocaust survivors, their children and grandchildren. While in the long term 
Israel needs to be abolished just as any other state, at this moment in time 
‘hardcore’ anti-Germans call for ‘unconditional solidarity with Israel’. 
The response of some anti-Germans to 9/ 11 also tested the tolerance of the 
movement by the wider radical Left in Germany – and broke it. The anti-German 
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assumption that the US-led war on Iraq should be understood as ‘anti-fascist’, since 
it was a direct response to the ‘antisemitic’ attacks on the Twin Towers, was no 
longer accepted in the majority of left-wing publications, websites, demonstrations 
or social centres. The Bahamas magazine, for example, had its webspace closed 
down and was removed from most radical bookshops. Anti-German groups were 
increasingly prevented from attending anti-fascist demonstrations and rallies. 
‘Hardcore’ anti-Germans turned their animosity towards poli tical Islam. With the 
9/ 11 attacks seen as an expression of the destructiveness of the Islamic movement, 
the ‘war on terror’ was welcomed. In reaction to the radical Left’s unwillingness to 
endorse the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, anti-Germans themselves called for the 
final break with the German Left, which they now regarded as standing at the 
forefront of a ‘volkish’-nationalist reaction against Israel and the USA: “ I f one is to 
be serious about the demand ‘For Communism’, one has to recognise that 
liberation and emancipation can only be achieved against the [antisemitic]  Left, 
never together with it” (Bahamas, quoted in Wetzel 2004, 117). 
 
 
I n the grasp of ident ity polit ics 
The anti-German self-understanding, therefore, has taken a direction that sees 
itself more critical of ideology [ ideologiekr itisch]  than critical of capitalism. 
However, Robert Kurz (2003) is quite right when he tries to define the ideological 
basis of the anti-German movement. While the national essentialism of the Israel 
solidarity politics could be dismissed as strategic, Kurz points us to the theoretical 
alignment of anti-German thought to the very analysis that it tries to overcome. 
Kurz, one of sharpest critics of what he terms “the anti-German ideology”, has 
argued that its argumentation remains an inadequate response to what he calls 
“labour movement Marxism” [Arbeiter bewegungsmarxismus] . Kurz depicts class 
struggle as system-immanent, and instead focuses on an analysis of the fetish form 
of capital and its crisis. While the anti-Germans share this rejection of labour as 
revolutionary subject (based on their reading of Frankfurt School theory), they, 
Kurz argues, counter-posit not capitalist crisis but an ontological understanding of 
reason and civi lisation. In the place of revolution, anti-German ‘communism’ 
succumbs to a mere defence of “bourgeois civilisation” (Kurz 2003, 63). Kurz is 
also critical of the traditional Left and its inabili ty, as he says, to understand the 
relationship between National Socialism and capitalism. The anti-German 
movement exploits this lack of clarity, as much as it exploits Auschwitz to defend 
the “bourgeois subject” and to decouple the Holocaust from the historical 
development of modernity. For Kurz, the origins of anti-German ideology are 
found in “bourgeois discourses” (Kurz 2003, 11). In particular, he maintains, the 
dichotomous logic of ‘barbarism’ vs. ‘Enlightenment’ that characterises much anti-
German criticism is structurally not dissimilar from the anti-imperialism that it 
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tries to distance itself from. Instead anti-Germanism perpetuates the binary 
conception of anti-modernity vs. modernity and projects i t back onto the level of 
states and nations (e.g. Palestine vs. Israel, Europe vs. America). 
I t is interesting to note how the anti-German critique of ideology is not restricted to 
German nationalism and political Islam, but also applied to European nation-
building. However, when ‘hardcore’ anti-Germans call for opposition to European 
integration – such as during a demonstration in Hamburg in 2004 – then this does 
no longer come as a critique of nationalism. Rather i t is coupled with an affirmative 
relationship to nation-states that are seen as the bulwark of civilisation against 
barbarism. The Anglo-Saxon model is heralded as the only way to prevent a 
resurgence of European antisemitism. In the context of the Hamburg 
demonstration, supported by more than two dozen anti-fascist and communist 
groups from the anti-German spectrum, this translated into a call to “show your 
colours! – for Israel, against Old Europe” (Bahamas 2004). In the original German 
call ‘show your colours’ has a double meaning, also translating as ‘show your flag’. 
I t made clear thus that the display of national flags of Israel and Anglo-Saxon 
countries was encouraged. A speech at the demonstration also clarified the 
connection between the anti-Germans pro-Israel stance and their ‘anti-fascism’: 
“Because of our common aims – from the rejection of anti-modern and collectivist 
tendencies to the affirmation of Enlightenment as our permanent task – a coalition 
with Israel is in our interest”  (Bahamas 2004).  
Accordingly, left-wing solidarity with Israel, while i t spans a movement much wider 
than that of the anti-Germans, has become a point of identification for the latter. 
Indeed, contrary to their claims, the defence of the Jewish state appears to be 
upheld on the basis of identity politics. Paradoxically, the treatment of ‘a people’ as 
a homogenous mass – something that anti-Germans accuse the anti-imperialist 
Left of – is reproduced in the anti-German discourse of Israel and the Jews (as well 
as of Germany and the US). Class and political differences and divisions within 
those societies are brushed over. ‘The Jews’ are treated as if ‘they’ represented a 
philosophy of liberation through their very existence as a ‘nation’ in the Middle 
East. The flag of the Israeli  state here has particular significance in this recourse to 
identity politics. I t is seen as a symbol not just of ‘concrete anti-fascism’ but as a 
sign of ‘progressive values’. Hanloser, for example, cites a number of anti-German 
justifications for using Israeli and American national emblems for ‘left-wing’ 
symbolism: “ Israeli flags on anti-fascist demonstrations”, one anti-German group 
writes, “are self-evident. They are not only to be accepted, which would still mean 
that they had to be defended, but should be welcomed there” (quoted in Hanloser 
2004b, 201). Another defends the anti-German ‘pro-Enlightenment’ position: “I t is 
our dirty job to counter the threefold wretchedness in Europe, which is anti-
Western, anti-modern and antisemitic. We can use a number of means to do this. 
One of them is the Israeli  flag” (ibid.). 
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The ‘unconditional solidarity with Israel’ position of the anti-Germans lives from its 
rivalry with i ts anti-imperialist, pro-Palestinian counterpart. The latter is 
denounced as anti-intellectual and latently antisemitic, and seen as stuck in the 
very Marxist-Leninist ideology that had been taken to task by Adorno and the 
Frankfurt School. Following Adorno’s logic, the anti-Germans condemn an anti-
imperialist ‘romantic anti-capitalism’, which sides with the collectivity of the 
oppressed regardless of i ts ideological background. They contend that the anti-
imperialist ideology, shared by Arab national liberation movements and the 
German Left alike, is based upon a foreshortened critique of capitalism that 
distinguishes between rapacious Jewish finance capital and the idea of a less evil 
form of productive capital linked to the labour movement. From the anti-German 
perspective, the historic association of Jews with the money sphere is analogous to 
the early National Socialist agenda to expropriate Jewish financiers. Similar 
accusations have been brought against the counter-globalisation movements more 
recently. The ‘ideological coalition’ of communist parties, national liberation 
movements, anti-globalists and Latin American socialist governments are thus 
described by anti-Germans as the ‘Antisemitic International’. The focus on a 
continuation of national socialist thinking in bourgeois society, as well as in 
antagonistic poli tical movements, brings with it a fixation on Germany that is 
analysed ahistorically. As such the anti-German ideology mixes up, or equates, the 
Germany of Kohl, Schröder and Merkel with that of Hitler. In the wake of the Gulf 
Wars, this perceived ideological coalition also included Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – 
leading to the kind of bellicose argumentation that the anti-Germans are now 
infamous for. I t is as if the anti-Germans wanted to defeat the Third Reich 
posthumously. 
In terms of our discussion so far, the dichotomous understanding of modernity and 
anti-modernity is precisely one that the anti-Germans have made their own. As 
such they regard the anti-imperialist Left, Islamism and Nazism as united in their 
perceived opposition to modernity. This anti-modern movement stands, according 
to the anti-Germans, in defence of a culture of barbarism. In response, they feel 
that i t is necessary to defend the achievements of modern civilisation and the 
Enlightenment. 
Accordingly, in their relationship with the German Left, ‘hardcore’ anti-Germans 
often refuse to enter theoretical argumentations, and very much restrict themselves 
to polemical denunciations. This includes the ever-present accusation that anyone 
not sharing an affirmative view of Western civilisation is antisemitic or holds 
national socialist beliefs. After the terror attacks of 9/ 11, this view was confirmed 
by a perceived uncritical response of the Left, and anti-Germans projected their 
civi lisation-revolutionary model onto the ‘axis of good’, primarily the USA and 
Israel. Anti-German anti-fascists thus adopted Auschwitz not as the starting point 
for a critique of the capital relation in the way that Horkheimer and Adorno had 
done, but as a means of legitimising Enlightenment ideology and the global war on 
Inter face:  a journal for  and about social movements Ar ticle 
Volume 2 (2):  199  - 219  (November  2010)  Schlembach, Anti-German “communism” 
 
214 
 
terror. Anti-Germanism therefore tends to equate capitalism with civi lisation and 
progress, with the Bahamas magazine rallying its readers “to the defence of 
civi lisation” (Bahamas 2001). Bahamas writes of a “pre-civilisation barbarism” that 
it juxtaposes to the “real-existing civi lisation” in the modern capitalist era (ibid.). 
Germany, as the ultimate epitomisation of the barbaric, finds its contemporary, 
‘anti-fascist’ opponents in the United States and Israel. As one anti-German group 
writes shortly after 9/ 11:  
[The antisemites and those who rationalise their beliefs] see the USA as a 
counter-image epitomising everything that has remained unachievable and is 
thus hated: cosmopolitanism, the promise of individual happiness and 
material wealth” (Antideutsche Gruppe Wuppertal 2001). 
Rhetorically, anti-Germans combine the defence of Western civi lisation with the 
historical possibi li ty of a movement towards communism: “ for civi lisation – for 
communism!” (ibid.). At the same time however, anti-Germans around the ISF and 
the magazine Bahamas abandoned the critique of modern capitalism for a critique 
of German ideology, thus focusing entirely on the Holocaust and National 
Socialism. The ISF argued that antisemitism was a necessary component of the 
bourgeois, capitalist society; a kind of “ immanent false consciousness” of its 
members (quoted in Kurz 2003, 19). As Kurz (2003, 30) writes, the anti-Germans 
thus replaced a critique of the nation and nationalism with a critique of the 
specificity of Germany (and Islam and Third Worldism). Instead of grasping the 
‘German ideology’ as a specific historical manifestation of modernity, he writes, the 
anti-Germans proceeded to an ahistorical and isolated critique of the Germans. In 
its typically polemical fashion, the ISF thus stated that Germany should be 
understood as “the society that can find its inner unity and identity only in 
annihi lation and mass murder” (Initiative Sozialistisches Forum 2001). 
 
 
Conclusions 
The anti-German critique of the Left is easily swept aside as a guilt-complex of 
German anti-fascists or the obsessive referral to Auschwitz. Their accusations of 
antisemitism, nationalism or even Nazism directed at left-wing poli tics are usually 
met with angry rejection or the dismissal as a fixation on identity poli tics. There is 
some truth in the latter, as Robert Kurz has shown. Nonetheless, in order to begin 
to understand where the anti-German critique of ideology has become ideological 
itself, i t was certainly necessary to situate it in the development of German radical 
Left thought, and the specificity of an extra-parliamentary Left faced with re-
unification and national renewal. The anti-Germans have not materialised into a 
vacuum of the German Left, but are a direct result of the latter. Much of anti-
German thought achieves its high-level of theoretical sophistication through its 
Inter face:  a journal for  and about social movements Ar ticle 
Volume 2 (2):  199  - 219  (November  2010)  Schlembach, Anti-German “communism” 
 
215 
 
philosophical reliance on Marxian and Frankfurt School critical theory. I ts origins 
are also found in the critiques of German anti-imperialist and armed struggle 
groups, rejecting their anti-Zionist and anti-intellectual actionism. However, a 
coherent poli tical analysis that could consolidate the anti-Germans as a significant 
part of the German anti-fascist movement was only developed in the wake of 
German unification and increasing xenophobia as well as resurfacing antisemitism. 
Significantly, this was not just restricted to the radical right-wing fringes of 
German society, but was seen by many anti-fascists as an integral element of the 
German bourgeoisie. I t is in this context that the radicalisation – and subsequent 
perversion – of anti-German thought took place. By describing how anti-German 
thought has returned to an essentialist notion of the nation, turning it at times into 
something more akin to anti-Muslim materialism, I  have sought to draw the line 
between anti-nationalism and anti-Germanism in i ts ‘hardcore’ form. 
I  am aware that I  have presented the anti-Germans as a very textual and theoretical 
stream rather than as a social movement. In parts, this is to counteract the 
journalistic and activist fascination with the anti-German street presence, their 
slogans and flag-waving. More than that however, i f one is to make a more critical 
distinction than that between ‘hardcore’ and ‘softcore’ anti-Germans, one would 
have to point to a discrepancy between their theoretical anti-collectivism and their 
‘praxis’ as a social movement. On the one hand, anti-German ‘communism’ 
becomes manifest in i ts intellectual sophistication and abstractness, especially 
where it is presented as a critical theory, i.e. as a negation of the affirmative poli tics 
of national liberation and collective actionism. From the perspectives of Bahamas 
or the ISF, for instance, collectivity becomes synonymous with fascism, and the 
perpetrator of Auschwitz is the collective willpower of the German mob. Israel and 
America are seen as representing a revolutionary Enlightenment that alone can 
defend the individual from nationalism. On the other hand, anti -Germanism has 
also taken the shape of a protest movement, which inevitably has to make reference 
to concrete, practical poli tics. This is where the anti-German ideology is driven ad 
absurdum. Paper planes thrown at Dresden citizens remembering the 1945 allied 
air raids on the city symbolise an ‘anti-fascist’ air force amid chants of ‘Bomber 
Harris – do it again’. Israeli flags take the meaning of a ‘pro-civilisation’ alliance of 
anti-German communists and Israeli  conservatives. Bellicose calls for American air 
strikes on Iran are apparently meant to create the civilisational pre-conditions for 
communism. Anti-Germanism thus itself becomes affirmative of the ideological 
baggage it starts out to criticise – with reversed signs. 
Previous analyses of the anti-German phenomenon as it appears ‘in the streets’ 
have tended to make predictions about i ts future development, usually predicting a 
rapprochement to conservative or neo-liberal politics and its disappearance from 
the scene of the radical Left. The ‘hardcore’ anti-Germans of the Bahamas journal, 
meanwhile, seem to take the logical consequence of the impossibility of combining 
their version of critical theory with practical, collective action. In the call for a 
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recent conference, Bahamas distance themselves from the anti-German label 
precisely because it has given the German Left the appearance of trying to draw 
lessons from Auschwitz once again: “The conference […] does explicitly not call 
itself anti-German and the organisers dispense with being part of a practical 
solidarity with Israel”  (Bahamas 2009). 
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